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Nicaragua and Honduras are neighbor countries situated in one of the 
most violent regions of the world. As such, they share many similarities, including 
geopolitics, a history of political violence and insurgency, as well as a repressive 
authoritarian past. In spite of the two countries’ similarities, their divergent 
policing and public security policies have led to equally divergent outcomes in 
crime and homicide rates. What factors explain this divergence? How effective 
are their respective policing and security policies in confronting the proliferation 
of violence among the youth of their nations? Analysis of these questions helps 
U.S. policy-makers gain greater understanding of the critical factors that are 
contributing to Central America’s escalating youth violence. By way of a most-
similar systems approach, this thesis analyzes the aspects that either enable or 
degrade state efforts to address their youth gang crisis. In sum, building strong 
and accountable criminal justice institutions as well as addressing the 
socioeconomic challenges that confront youth populations are necessary 
preconditions for reducing youth violence. To assist our regional partners in 
restoring security to their nations, U.S. policymakers need to promote programs 
that help strengthen institutional capacities and expand social programs that 
assist at-risk youth. 
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According to a 2013 U.N. study, Nicaragua ranks among the safest 
countries in the world, with only 11 homicides per 100,000 people.1 The 
Nicaraguan government has managed to maintain low levels of homicides 
through the application of domestic security policies that do not involve the 
military.2 Conversely, Honduras recorded the highest homicide rate in the world 
the same year, 90 homicides per 100,000 people (see Figure 1).3 To limit the 
violence, the Honduran government has militarized its domestic security efforts to 
gain greater control over gang-ridden regions. The extensive persecution and 
imprisonment of youth gang members, however, has failed to reduce the 
incidence of crime and violence.4 A focused comparison between these two 
countries may allow us to identify causal variables that produce the high rate of 
homicides and gang violence in Honduras but not in Nicaragua. Furthermore, by 
comparing and contrasting judicial systems, law enforcement structures, 
domestic security policies, and existing social programs in Honduras and 
Nicaragua, we can extract valuable lessons for the development of effective 
public security reforms.  
Understanding the region’s failing and successful policing strategies is 
significant to U.S. policymakers. Since 2008, the U.S. Congress has appropriated 
over $1.2 billion to fund the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) 
and interagency programs that support its objectives to help restore security to 
the region.5 An extensive analysis is necessary to ensure that U.S.-sponsored 
                                            
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study on Homicide 2013: 
Trends, Contexts, Data (Vienna: UNODC, 2013), 126.  
2 José Miguel Cruz, “Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival 
of the Violent State,” Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 4 (2011): 19–21. 
3 UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2013, 126. 
4 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Development in Central 
America: Caught in the Crossfire (Vienna: UNODC, 2007), 9. 
5 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Central America: U.S. Agencies Considered 
Various Factors in Funding Security Activities, but Need to Assess Progress in Achieving 
Interagency Objectives (GAO-13-771) (Washington, DC: GAO, September 2013), 9.  
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programs do not inadvertently fund failing policies that contribute to the 
escalating youth violence and human rights violations. As the United States 
continues to invest billions of dollars toward security-assistance programs in 
Central America, funded programs should reinforce only successful policies, 
those that reduce violence and improve the capabilities of vital institutions. By 
analyzing how Honduran security policies have failed to control the surge in 
violence and how Nicaragua has managed to achieve safer conditions, CARSI 
policy-makers could develop improved comprehensive security strategies and 
replicate successful policies throughout Central America. Furthermore, under-
standing the theoretical frameworks that explain how Honduras and Nicaragua 
developed their security policies can help predict whether the security institutions 
of the respective nations will embrace or reject policy recommendations. 
Figure 1.  Regional Homicide Map, 20126 
 
 
                                            
6 “War on Drugs—Central America,” Global Security.org, last modified June 22, 2015, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/war-on-drugs-centam.htm. 
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A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many social theorists have sought to identify and explain the factors that 
are causing youth crime rates to climb in Central America. These scholars have 
written books and articles to provide policy suggestions and to support the 
affected nations with effective policing and prevention strategies. A great portion 
of the literature focuses on two major themes: criticism and descriptions of 
policing methods to confront youth violence; and explanations for why nations 
implement certain policies. This literature review analyzes the major themes that 
pertain to state responses to the tragic escalation of youth violence in Central 
America. 
1. The Heavy-Handed Approach—Mano Dura 
Most of the available literature on Central America focuses on the policing 
strategies common among the Northern Triangle states of Honduras, Guatemala, 
and El Salvador. Some regional leaders have embraced zero-tolerance policing, 
such as mano dura (heavy-handed) policing, under the assumption that such 
policies would be effective at improving security in locations overrun by criminal 
activity.7 The underlying assumption of this policy is that, through the use of 
aggressive tactics, military and police can deter anti-social behaviors that often 
take root in dangerous neighborhoods. By criminalizing misdemeanors and 
perceived unlawful behaviors as well as implementing strong punishments for 
them, security forces hope to deter prospective criminals’ lawless and violent 
intentions.8 
Political Science Professor Mark Ungar argues that Latin American 
leaders often enact zero-tolerance policies without the necessary oversight 
mechanisms to ensure security agencies effectively reduce violent crimes as well 
                                            
7 Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, Central America Regional Security Initiative: 
Background and Policy Issues for Congress (CRS Report for Congress No. R41731), 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014, 12–15.  
8 Mark Ungar, “Policing Youth in Latin America,” in Youth Violence in Latin America, eds. 
Dennis Rodgers and Gareth A. Jones (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 205. 
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as respect the civil rights of the communities they serve.9 Youth populations tend 
to be the most obvious victims of zero-tolerance policing, for they often suffer 
police brutality and unwarranted persecution. According to Ungar, “90 percent of 
the victims of police abuse were men between the ages of 15 and 24” from poor 
neighborhoods.10 Enrique Desmond Arias also claims that mano dura programs 
are counterproductive because they have increased the levels of violence in the 
streets of Central America. Disenfranchised youths have become more 
aggressive in response to increased incarcerations and hostility from security 
forces. Previously disorganized gangs are now more cohesive in coordinating 
attacks against security forces, rival gangs, and the public.11 The contributions of 
both Ungar and Arias are useful in explaining the failures of mano dura policies. 
Furthermore, they give credibility to claims that ineffective policing and 
repression only instigate violent responses from oppressed youth. 
2. Soft-Handed and Community-Oriented Approaches 
In an effort to avoid replicating the failures of mano dura policies, Mark 
Ungar and José Luis Rocha advocate for more lenient policing strategies.12 They 
recommend state agencies implement soft-handed approaches that promote 
prevention, rehabilitation, and community-building to reduce gang-related youth 
violence. Ungar attests that community-oriented policing is far more effective 
than mano dura strategies because it aims to address and resolve the social ills 
that are impacting Central American youth. Community-oriented policing seeks to 
establish stronger ties between community members, police officers, and social 
service organizations. State agencies reduce criminal behavior and gang 
membership among the youth by establishing better coordination between 
                                            
9 Ibid., 205–6.  
10 Ibid., 206. 
11 Enrique Desmond Arias, “State Power and Central American Maras: A Cross-National 
Comparison,” in Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, 
Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011), 132. 
12 José Luis Rocha, “Street Gangs of Nicaragua,” in Maras: Gang Violence and Security in 
Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 2011), 118–9; Ungar, “Policing Youth in Latin America,” 214–216.  
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criminal justice agencies, local schools, and social services that support at-risk 
youth.13  
Through community policing, officers have greater opportunities to 
become involved within their communities and build relationships with local 
youths. Furthermore, police officers gain invaluable insight into the immediate 
hardships and concerns inflicting the lives of disenfranchised local residents.14 
According to José Luis Rocha, policing strategies that integrate support from 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are highly proactive in reducing gang 
violence. NGOs reinforce police-sponsored community-building projects because 
they help establish job programs for unskilled youths and encourage civic 
participation.15 In recent years, the Nicaraguan National Police’s Juvenile Affairs 
Division has achieved substantial reductions in gang membership by conducting 
anti-gang activities that target at-risk youth within the impoverished municipalities 
of Nicaragua.16 
3. Democratic Transitions: Their Impact on Internal Security  
According to a recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), repressive and heavy-handed approaches remain 
commonplace in Central America.17 Following the transition from authoritarian to 
democratic rule, many Central American security elites who were members of the 
former authoritarian governments still hold positions of power within the new 
democratic regimes.18 For this reason, scholars examine authoritarian transitions 
toward democracy in an effort to explain their impact on internal security. A 
preponderance of the literature claims that the manner in which states transition 
                                            
13 Ungar, “Policing Youth in Latin America,” 214–215. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Rocha, “Street Gangs of Nicaragua,” 114. 
16 Clare Ribando Seelke, Gangs in Central America (CRS Report for Congress No. 
RL34112), Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014, 10. 
17 UNODC, Crime and Development in Central America, 14 
18 Ibid. 
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from their former authoritarian regimes determines the type of democratic regime 
that eventually emerges.  
Charles T. Call explores the influence of government transitions on 
security reforms in new democracies. According to Call, the modes of transition 
matter because they determine whether an emerging democratic state will be 
successful in establishing meaningful security reforms. He argues that war 
transitions or the collapse of authoritarian regimes offer the best opportunities for 
post-authoritarian governments to enact significant security reforms.19 
Meaningful civilian-led security reforms can only transpire when the armed forces 
of the pre-existing regime have been significantly weakened or demilitarized. 
Complete collapses of existing authoritarian regimes also give way to new 
security, intelligence, and legal institutions, which are more responsive to and 
representative of the public’s security needs. Because a weakened security force 
is a prerequisite, a state that does not undergo a war transition is bound to 
struggle in achieving meaningful reforms.20 At the time of his article’s publication, 
Call considered Honduras an exceptional case because it was able to advance 
significant security reforms without undergoing a war transition. Contrary to the 
regional norm, the country was able to undergo a nonviolent democratic 
transition and establish comprehensive security reforms by significantly 
weakening and subordinating its armed forces.21 Call’s observations also 
validate Nicaragua’s ability to improve security reforms in the aftermath of the 
Somoza government’s collapse. However, his argument falls short of explaining 
why Honduras has resorted to highly repressive and militarized security policies 
after achieving significant improvements in the 1990s.  
José Miguel Cruz has also contributed to the democratic transition 
literature. He argues that nations are better able to implement effective security 
                                            
19 Charles T. Call, “War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin America,” 
Comparative Politics 35, no.1 (2002): 4. 
20 Ibid., 17–18. 
21 Call, “War Transitions,” 13. 
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reforms only when violent entrepreneurs from the prior regime are excluded from 
the political transition process. Cruz points to a critical juncture at which point a 
state has the opportunity to prevent former security elites from maintaining 
positions of power within the security apparatus of the post-transition 
government. When violent entrepreneurs continue to exercise power, states are 
destined to endure high levels of violence.22 In the case of Nicaragua, Cruz 
claims that it was able to achieve significant security reforms through the 
complete removal of the Somoza regime and demobilization of Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN) security forces in the 1990s. As a result, the 
Nicaraguan state has been effective in maintaining a lower incidence of violence 
and capable of addressing its domestic gang problems. In contrast, Honduran 
violent entrepreneurs who formed part of the military dictatorship continue to hold 
prominent positions within police, military, and intelligence institutions. Because 
Honduras’ transition was incomplete, violent entrepreneurs persist in promoting a 
culture of violence in which security institutions continue to employ repressive 
tactics against civilians.23 
4. Institutional Arguments 
In his article “Violence, Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America,” 
Todd Landman claims that many Latin American nations lack state institutions 
with the capacity to safeguard the rights of their citizens.24 When states have 
weak institutions, they are unable to provide citizens basic legal protections or 
shield them from unjust persecution from rogue state-actors. Landman asserts 
that the state itself becomes the biggest perpetrator of violence when its 
government fails to establish the necessary legal conditions and oversight 
mechanisms to employ state violence lawfully. When security institutions are 
                                            
22 Cruz, “Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America,” 1–3. 
23 Ibid., 19–21. 
24 Todd Landman, “Violence, Democracy, and Human Rights in Latin America,” in Violent 
Democracies in Latin America, eds. Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 227. 
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weak and lack systems of accountability, security actors are prone to exploit their 
positions of authority and ignore the legal protections and rights of citizens. To 
resolve such abuses of power, states need to build strong legal institutions and 
employ systems of horizontal and vertical accountability to ensure state agencies 
neither abuse their privileges nor violate the rights of citizens.25  
A state is less likely to behave in a repressive manner or carry out extra-
legal forms of violence when it builds strong legal institutions and systems of 
oversight to reinforce its security strategies.26 Todd Landman’s institutional 
arguments are highly effective in identifying the major flaws that exist within 
failing Latin American security policies. Furthermore, his arguments provide an 
explanatory framework for defining why Honduras and Nicaragua continue to 
experience divergent results in providing security and maintaining low levels of 
youth violence. An analysis of these two countries may demonstrate that their 
abilities to implement effective security policies are closely linked to their 
institutional capacities to apply the rule of law and respect the legal rights of 
individuals. 
5. Structural Arguments 
The Central American states that have felt the greatest impact from the 
U.S. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act are more 
inclined to employ aggressive anti-gang strategies. Since the implementation of 
this 1996 U.S. policy to deport criminals back to their nations of origin, many 
Central American nations have become saturated with youth gang members, 
called mareros or maras. According to Dennis Rodgers, Robert Muggah, and 
Chris Stevenson, this policy created devastating security challenges when it led 
to the U.S. deportation of more than 200,000 criminal and illegal immigrants back 
to Central America from 1998 to 2005.27 However, the long-term social and 
                                            
25 Ibid., 237–9 
26 Ibid. 
27 Dennis Rodgers et al., Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, and Interventions 
(Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2009), 7.  
 9 
security impacts of the criminal deportees vary by country. The Northern Triangle 
has endured significant increases in gang violence because it received over 90 
percent of the deportees. A large portion of the criminal deportees were 
members of two of the most ruthless street gangs in Los Angeles, the 18th Street 
Gang and the Mara-Salvatrucha. Upon return, former U.S. gang members 
quickly replicated the same criminal behavior and violent tendencies of the East 
Los Angeles streets in the neighborhoods of El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras. In contrast, Nicaragua did not experience the surge in gang violence 
since only three percent of deportees were of Nicaraguan descent. Furthermore, 
the Nicaraguan diaspora in the United States has tended to settle in Miami, 
where its immigrants have not assimilated into the ethno-centric gangs 
dominated by African- and Cuban-Americans.28 Advocates of the deportation 
literature explain how U.S. immigration policies have created a security crisis in 
the Northern Triangle region. However, they fall short of explaining why the 
inflicted states have failed to integrate deportees into society before they 
assimilate into criminal organizations.  
Structuralists also attribute the rise in Central American violence to the 
youth gangs’ increasing involvement in drug-trafficking.29 According to a 2012 
UNODC report on transnational organized crime, Central America began to 
experience an increased incidence of violence once greater quantities of cocaine 
shipments began traversing the region in 2006. Traffickers began to utilize 
Central American drug routes with greater regularity when the Mexican 
government became more adept at intercepting drug shipments arriving directly 
from South America. As a result of Mexico’s 2006 anti-narcotic strategy, drug 
traffickers found it less risky to transport cocaine into Mexico through the 
overland routes of Central America. With greater quantities of cocaine moving 
through the region, Central American gangs began to fight each other for control 
                                            
28 Ibid., 7–9.  
29 José Miguel Cruz et al., “Political Transition, Social Violence, and Gangs: Cases in Central 
America and Mexico,” in In the Wake of War: Democratization and Internal Armed Conflict in 
Latin America, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 317. 
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of critical drug routes. In Honduras, the regions that have experienced the 
greatest incidence of violence are located directly along mobility corridors used to 
transport cocaine. Along with the upsurge of drugs moving through Central 
America comes an increase in turf wars between rival gangs.30 In response, 
Central American governments have begun implementing stricter measures to 
address the unprecedented levels of violence they are experiencing.31 A gap that 
exists within the drug trafficking literature is the exclusion of Nicaragua. Similar to 
the Northern Triangle states, Nicaragua is a major transient state for U.S.-bound 
drugs. However, in contrast, it has not experienced the same upsurge in violent 
clashes of youth gangs. 
Structural arguments also claim that states implement security policies to 
address the societal perceptions of youth gangs. When communities, the media, 
and political elites all see youths as menaces to public security, they encourage 
security institutions to enact harsh and repressive policies. However, when the 
public discourse does not classify youths as threats, the public is less likely to 
support harsh anti-gang policies. In his article “Youth Violence in Central 
America: Discourse and Polices,” Peter Peetz argues, “There is a strong 
relationship and mutual influence between the public’s fear (or disregard) of 
youth violence and the state’s policies to reduce that kind of violence.”32 Hence, 
public perceptions are a significant driving factor in determining state preferences 
over security and prevention strategies. In many Central American 
neighborhoods, the public considers youth gangs the primary threat to domestic 
security. Since youth gangs are the most visible groups to display anti-social 
behavior, they intensify public anxieties and concerns over domestic security.33 
Peetz’s observations demonstrate how public opinion can shape the security 
                                            
30 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transnational Organized Crime in 
Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment (Vienna: UNODC, 2012), 11. 
31 Cruz et al., “Political Transition, Social Violence, and Gangs,” 317.  
32 Peter Peetz, “Youth Violence in Central America: Discourses and Policies,” Youth & 
Society 43, no. 4 (2011): 1487. 
33 Ibid., 1487–88. 
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policies that states implement. However, his argument falls short of explaining 
how states can appease the public’s perception of violent youths. According to 
his argument, harsh and repressive policies will remain commonplace unless the 
public begins to sympathize with disenfranchised this demographic. 
B. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Among the various explanations that scholars have provided to explain the 
dynamics of Central American security policies and the factors that propagate 
violence, none were more convincing than the institutional arguments provided 
by Todd Landman.34 He makes the case that security policies can only be 
successful when they are reinforced by strong and accountable institutions. 
Furthermore, Ungar and Rocha provide a useful framework for addressing the 
social ills that are inflicting at-risk youth through the incorporation of prevention 
and rehabilitation programs.35 Strong institutions and prevention programs 
appear to be the essential elements for building stronger and safer communities. 
For these reasons, this thesis hypothesizes that Honduras continues to exercise 
repressive, ineffective security policies because it possesses weak institutions 
and has failed to promote social programs that assist its vulnerable youth 
population. Conversely, Nicaragua has been able to maintain lower homicide 
rates and a lower incidence of youth violence because it has moderately better 
institutions and a robust program to provide social services to potential gang 
members and juvenile delinquents. In order for security strategies to succeed in 
reducing youth violence, Central American states need to strengthen their 
criminal justice institutions as well as promote programs that help improve the 
socioeconomic challenges of at-risk youth. 
                                            
34 Landman, “Violence, Democracy, and Human Rights in Latin America,” 229–240.  
35 Ungar, “Policing Youth in Latin America,” 206; Rocha, “Street Gangs of Nicaragua,” 114. 
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C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Given their proximate location, economic underdevelopment, and social 
similarities, this thesis will provide a comparative analysis of Honduras and 
Nicaragua using a most-similar systems approach. These two countries are ideal 
cases to study because, despite their similarities, these states have significant 
variations in their security policies and homicide rates. The aim of this thesis is to 
compare and contrast Honduran and Nicaraguan efforts to address their security 
dilemmas and constrain the escalation of youth gang violence. By comparing and 
contrasting the policies that these states have implemented, this thesis will 
attempt to identify the variables that are contributing to Honduras failure and 
Nicaragua’s success to reduce the high incidence of homicides and gang 
violence. At the end of this process, this thesis aims to isolate the factors that are 
contributing to Honduras’ security difficulties in an effort to provide policy 
recommendations. This thesis relies on the data of various sources to include 
public policy documents, scholarly books, journals, and articles. For statistical 
data, this thesis makes us of informational reports published by organizations, 
such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the Washington Office on Latin 
America, the World Health Organization, the Wilson Center, and other reputable 
institutions. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In the forthcoming chapters, this thesis will identify correlations between 
the outcomes of existing state security policies and the strength of their 
respective law enforcement, judicial, and penal institutions. This thesis will also 
identify linkages between the application of preventative and rehabilitative social 
programs for youths and their ability to reduce violence and improve security 
conditions. Chapters II and III will focus on Honduras and Nicaragua, 
respectively. The chapters will present how each country is addressing its 
juvenile delinquency issues, through the implantation of domestic policies, 
security reforms, and social programs. This thesis will make use of statistical 
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data to highlight the variation between the nations, to include: crime and violence 
trends, human rights records, prison demographics, gang populations, and 
immigration/deportation trends. Chapter IV will summarize the findings and offer 
recommendations for future U.S. policy considerations and CARSI initiatives.   
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II. HONDURAS  
As a result of escalating youth gang violence, the Central American nation 
of Honduras is currently undergoing a devastating national security crisis. 
According to a U.N. study, Honduras was the most dangerous country in the 
world in 2013, with a documented 90 homicides per 100,000 people.36 Figures 
from the World Bank reveal that young men in Central America, between the 
ages of 15 and 25, are the predominant offenders and victims of violence.37 
World Bank assessments also indicate that extreme poverty, lack of education, 
and the influx of cocaine trafficking into the Central American region are among 
the primary drivers impelling Honduran youth to adopt delinquent behavior and 
join major transnational criminal gangs.38 In an effort to restore public security 
and reduce the incidence of youth violence, the Honduran government has 
embraced zero-tolerance policies such as mano dura, or heavy-handed policing. 
Governments undergoing significant security issues often prefer mano dura 
policies, for they believe that mass incarcerations can be effective in restoring 
order when properly implemented.39 However, the Honduran government’s 
efforts to apply mano dura policies against their criminal youth have been 
counterproductive because the levels of violence have continued to rise steeply 
since 2002. The Honduran government has been unsuccessful in addressing 
youth violence because it has weak criminal justice institutions to enforce mano 
dura policies and has failed to address the socioeconomic challenges confronting 
Honduran youth.40  
                                            
36 UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2013, 126. 
37 The World Bank, Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge, 
Washington, DC: The World Bank, Sustainable Development Department and Poverty Reduction 
and Economic Management Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, 2011, 15–17. 
38 Ibid., 3–18. 
39 Ungar, “Policing Youth in Latin America,” 205. 
40 Arias, “State Power and Central American Maras,” 132. 
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This chapter examines why the Honduran government continues to 
exercise repressive, ineffective mano dura policies even when it possesses weak 
criminal justice institutions and has failed to promote social programs that may 
assist its vulnerable youth population. The first section provides an overview of 
youth violence in Honduras. The next section explains how the Honduran 
government has relied on repressive zero-tolerance policies to confront rising 
youth violence and gang criminality. Section three highlights the institutional 
weaknesses that exist within the Honduran national security apparatus to 
effectively employ mano dura policies. Section four elaborates on the Honduran 
government’s efforts to collaborate with NGOs to implement preventative and 
rehabilitative strategies for youth violence and gangs. The chapter concludes 
with findings and recommendations for improving the Honduran government’s 
approach for reducing youth violence. 
A. THE EXTENT OF YOUTH VIOLENCE IN HONDURAS 
In the last 15 years, Honduran youth have experienced a drastic increase 
in violence (see Figure 2). Incidences of violence and homicides involving 
Honduran youth rank among the highest in the world. In Honduras, young men 
ranging from ages 12 to 24 are more likely to die by violence than by any other 
cause.41 Although young males make up only 14 percent of the Honduran 
population, the national police reported in 2001 that youth homicides represented 
more than 70 percent of the violent deaths recorded for that year.42 As homicide 
rates continue to climb in the Central American nation, young males continue to 
play a major role in carrying out violent acts and representing the demographic 
that endures the highest levels of homicide victimization. 
  
                                            
41 Jon Wolseth, “Safety and Sanctuary: Pentecostalism and Youth Gang Violence in 
Honduras” Latin American Perspectives 35, Issue 161, no. 4 (2008): 98. 
42 Ibid. 
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Figure 2.  Homicide Rates in Honduras43 
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lacking the opportunities to improve their socioeconomic conditions and escape 
their impoverished situations. Currently, the Honduran economy is not producing 
sufficient well-paying jobs to employ young adults seeking to enter the job 
market. Youth academic underperformance is also decreasing their ability to 
compete for good jobs. According to the INE survey, only 58 percent of minors 
between the ages of 5 and 18 were attending any form of educational institution. 
As children get older, their opportunities to receive a high school diploma 
                                            
43 UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2013, 126. 
44 Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), Cuadragésima Primera Encuesta Permanente de 
















2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Homicide Rates in Honduras, 2000 - 2012  
(per 100,000 inhabitants) 
 18 
significantly decrease, since only 28 percent of Honduran youth between the 
ages of 16 and 18 were still enrolled in school.45 Confronting severe economic 
conditions, families are increasingly relying on their children to work and 
contribute to the family income. As a result, many young students are dropping 
out of school to work informal, poor paying jobs. Honduran youth have the 
potential to improve their economic struggles and become productive citizens 
only when they gain the capacity to earn a high school diploma and acquire the 
skills to earn a well-paying job. Otherwise, extreme poverty and the lack of formal 
education will continue to induce youth to engage in criminal endeavors. 
Marginalized Honduran youth, who are uneducated, lack essential job 
skills, and do not have supportive family networks, are extremely vulnerable to 
joining the highly criminal and violent Honduran maras, such as the Mara 
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the Barrio 18 (18th Street Gang). In the last 15 years, 
the maras have been able to exploit the ongoing social conditions that currently 
exist in Honduran. Increasingly, youth are finding themselves becoming isolated 
from their homes and in desperate need of financial support. For many youth, 
joining a violent transnational gang is the only viable solution to escape their 
economic struggles and sense of abandonment by their families and 
government. As a result, Honduras has been experiencing substantial growth in 
gang memberships since the 1990s.46 In 2007, the U.N. Office on Drugs and 
Crime estimated that Honduras was the nation with the most gang members in 
Central America. Although difficult to measure, the UNODC estimated that 
Honduras had over 36,000 gang members. Based on this figure, one in every 20 
young males between the ages of 15 to 24 was a member of a Honduran mara 
or street gang (See Table 1).47 
                                            
45 INE, Cuadragésima Primera Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, 6,14. 
46 Sonja Wolf, “Mara Salvatrucha: The Most Dangerous Street Gang in the Americas?” Latin 
American Politics and Society 54, no. 1 (2012): 70. 
47 UNODC, Crime and Development in Central America, 60. 
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 Honduras 36,000 
 Guatemala 14,000 
 El Salvador 10,500 
 Nicaragua 4,500 
 
Due to the overwhelming lack of legitimate employment opportunities, 
youth gang members in Honduras raise revenues through illicit means. Making 
matter worst, the methods that gangs employ to make money are becoming 
increasingly violent as the Honduran economy continues to stagnate. Some of 
the criminal methods that gangs employ to make money include: robberies, 
illegal sales of weapons, drug-trafficking, extortions, and murder for hire. Within 
the major Honduran cities of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, extortion rackets 
are the primary method that gangs employ to extract money from the public. For 
instance, youth gang members extort the majority of legal and illegal businesses 
that operate within their gang’s defined territories. Small store owners, bus and 
taxi drivers, prostitutes, and drug dealers all have to pay steep extortion taxes to 
local gang members to continue operating their businesses. When business 
owners or workers refuse to pay the extortion rates, gang members respond 
violently by destroying their businesses or by assassinating business owners and 
members of their families. Increasingly within the last ten years, hundreds of 
business owners and workers, primarily within the informal transportation 
sectors, have been murdered by gang members due to their inability to meet the 
overwhelming monetary demands of gangs.49  
Within the last 15 years, Honduran youth gangs have also expanded the 
types of victims that they are now inclined to murder. Gang members no longer 
hesitate to kill or critically injure rival gang members, police informants, kids who 
                                            
48 Ibid. 
49 Wolf, “Mara Salvatrucha,” 78 
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decline to join their gangs, and young women who resist their sexual advances.50 
Scholars also attribute the high levels of violence to emergent gang initiation 
rituals and territorial disputes. As a demonstration of gang loyalty, aspiring 
members are performing rites of passage that entail killing innocent bystanders 
or members of rival gangs. Additionally, many violent acts and homicides are a 
result of turf disputes between rival gang as they battle to retain control of drug 
trafficking routes and neighborhoods.51 
U.S. deportation policies are also contributing to the escalation of youth 
violence in Honduras. In accordance to the U.S. Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), U.S. custom officials are deporting 
thousands of criminals and youth gang members to Honduras annually. Since 
many of the deportees have extensive criminal records or have tattoos portraying 
that they belong to notorious U.S. gangs, the Honduran government has been 
unable to integrate thousands of deportees into their society. Also complicating 
the reintegration of deportees are issues, such as: many of the deportees do not 
have families to return to and many do not speak Spanish, since they fled to the 
U.S. with their entire families as small children. As a result, many deportees that 
possess violent, criminal inclinations end up assimilating into the Honduran 
gangs, such as the MS-13 and Barrio 18. In contrast to the Honduran state, the 
violent transnational MS-13 and Barrio 18 gangs have been more effective in 
reintegrating deportees, thus further expanding their numbers and capacity to 
inflict violence.52 As of 2003, Honduras has had to reconstitute over 330,000 
deportees from the United States (See Table 2).53 
                                            
50 Ibid., 78 
51 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Pandillas and Security in Central America,” Latin American 
Research Review 49, no. 2 (2014): 160. 
52 Joanna Mateo, “Street Gangs of Honduras,” in Maras: Gang Violence and Security in 
Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 2011), 94–95. 
53 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “Aliens Apprehended by Region and 
Country of Nationality,” 2012 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Washington, DC: DHS, 2013), p. 
93. 
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Table 2.   Annual Flow of U.S Deportations to Central America, DHS54 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Guatemala 10,355 14,288 25,909 25,144 23,907 33,690 33,882 36,228 39,153 55,307 
Honduras 16,632 26,555 55,756 33,394 28,265 33,771 31,818 29,939 29,120 48,984 
El Salvador 11,757 19,180 42,885 46,314 19,699 27,151 26,776 27,539 25,592 37,197 
Nicaragua 1,055  1,664 4,272 3,228 2,119 2,801 2,674 2,417 2,150 2,413 
 
 
                                            
54 DHS, “2012 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics,” 92–93. 
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As a result of gang violence, Honduran crime and homicide rates are 
surging drastically and are hindering the social and economic recovery of the 
nation. The high numbers of gang members committing crimes in the streets of 
Honduras have far exceeded the capacity of the national police and judicial 
system to maintain control and keep citizens safe. Rather than dedicating 
needed resources toward national economic recovery projects and investing 
toward the struggling, impoverished education system, the state has committed 
extensive economic resources to confront rising internal security threats. Foreign 
investors are also discouraged from expanding and taking advantage of business 
opportunities within Honduras as the state appears incapable of curbing the 
violence and reestablishing order. As long as the streets of Honduras remain 
dangerous, economic and social progress remains elusive.55 
B. STATE RESPONSES TO YOUTH VIOLENCE 
Since 2002, the Honduran government has implemented many measures 
to reestablish order and security. Unfortunately, government institutions, to 
include the Honduran National Police, the judiciary, and the penal system, have 
all struggled to contain and prevent widespread criminal behavior associated with 
disenfranchised youth. Early on, politicians and policy-makers implemented 
aggressive, short-sighted policies that ultimately served to make security 
conditions worst.56 As it stands, many policies have failed to reduce the 
increasing rates of violent crimes and homicides; ironically, many security efforts 
have had the unintended consequence of making youth gangs stronger, more 
organized, and more effective at carrying out their criminal activities.57  
                                            
55 Mateo, “Street Gangs of Honduras,” 88. 
56 Mark Ungar, “La Mano Dura: Current Dilemmas in Latin America Police Reform,” in 
Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America, eds. Marcelo 
Bergman and Laurence Whitehead (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 93–
95. 
57 Wolf, “Mara Salvatrucha,” 71–72. 
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1. Mano Dura and Honduran Anti-gang Policies 
Soon after winning the Honduran presidential election on a staunch 
security platform, Honduran President Ricardo Maduro initiated the first of many 
anti-gang policies in 2002. Since security conditions were quickly deteriorating 
within the nation and throughout the northern triangle of Central America, the 
Honduran electorate overwhelmingly supported Maduro’s policies that aimed to 
bring about a decisive end to social violence and growing insecurity. In rapid 
succession, Maduro and his administration were successful in reforming security 
policies in Article 332 of the Honduran Penal Code to directly target youth gangs. 
Successively, Maduro put into effect the security policies of Cero Tolerancia 
(Zero Tolerance), Mano Dura, and the Ley Antimaras (Anti-Gang Law).58 The 
accumulated effect of these policies bestowed overwhelming authority to the 
police and military to conduct aggressive raids and security patrols within 
communities suspected of having high gang populations. In efforts to disband 
youth gangs and dissuade juveniles from joining them, Maduro’s anti-gang laws 
made it lawful for police authorities to incarcerate individuals who are active 
members of a gang and youth who have close associations with them. Even in 
situations where individuals did not commit any crimes, anti-gang legislation 
made it possible for police to charge them with offences that carried heavy jail 
sentences.59 
Regrettably, the aggressive approaches adopted by Honduran politicians 
and national security services failed to prevent youth from associating with gangs 
or taking part in criminal activities. With the prevalence of mano dura policies, the 
levels of violence have continued to escalate dramatically throughout the country. 
Although the ruthless anti-gang policies achieved limited success in reducing 
national homicide rates during their first few years in practice, homicide rates 
                                            
58 Lirio Gutierrez Rivera, “Security Policies from a Spatial Perspective: The Case of 
Honduras,” Iberoamericana XI, no. 41 (2011): 149. 
59 Ibid., 149–150. 
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began to surge in 2005.60 Recorded homicides are now 200 percent greater from 
what they were at their lowest point in 2005.61 
2. The Downsides of the Mano Dura Strategy 
Among the primary issues that Honduran politicians and security 
institutions failed to anticipate was the massive overpopulation of incarcerated 
gang members that were a direct result of their strong-arm approach. Beginning 
in 2002, the government corralled thousands of youth gang members into 
severely understaffed and congested prisons. As a result, Honduran prisons and 
detention centers soon began to serve as command centers for the powerful 
Maras such as the MS-13 and the Barrio 18. Youth that were previously 
unaffiliated with any gangs had no choice but to join the Maras to ensure their 
survival within the prison system. Small disorganized gangs, also known as 
clicas, began to merge with the dominant Maras. Through the Honduran prison 
system, gangs were able to evolve into more violent organizations, expand their 
ranks, and better control their criminal enterprises from within the prison walls. 
The ineffectiveness of the Honduran Prison system also contributed to escalating 
the levels of violence. Massive prison riots became a common occurrence due to 
extreme overcrowded conditions. The poor administration and security of the 
Honduran prison system led to the deaths of many young detainees. By the time 
most Honduran youth complete their jail sentences they adapt violent behaviors 
and establish affiliations with maras, which they did not have prior to their 
incarcerations.62  
Most prominent scholars on Central American security matters agree that 
the Honduran strong-arm approach was an inappropriate response toward 
improving the security conditions of the nation. Furthermore, such policies failed 
to protect the civil rights of Honduran youth and children from undue police 
                                            
60 Mateo, “Street Gangs of Honduras,” 98–99. 
61 UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2013, 126. 
62 Mateo, “Street Gangs of Honduras,” 98. 
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persecution. Mano dura policies that targeted youth gangs were flawed for many 
reasons. First, politicians and security institutions primarily targeted youth gangs, 
even when police and government institutions recognized that they were 
contributing only a third of national criminal offenses and homicides.63 A strong 
stance against youth gangs also provided political gains to government officials, 
so their constituents would perceive them as being tough on crime. Rather than 
targeting hardened criminal organizations or attempting to solve the social ills 
that were compelling youth to a life of crime, youth gangs became the scape 
goats for many politicians and security institutions.64  
Second, unqualified and unprofessional police and military personnel, 
performing the duties prescribed under the mano dura policies, consistently 
overstepped their authority and carried out extensive abuses of power against 
youths. Through their expanded police powers, security personnel terrorized the 
youths of poor neighborhoods by conducting mass raids to incarcerate perceived 
gang members and force confessions out of them. For many years, police 
officers also incarcerated thousands of youths with very little criminal evidence. 
As a result of these abusive practices, thousands of youth and children have 
fallen victims to extrajudicial killings carried out by improperly trained security 
officers.65 According to Mark Ungar, Honduran state officials estimated that there 
were over 2,300 extrajudicial killings of youth and children from 1998 to 2005, 
many of which were attributed to the police.66 However, security officials 
suspected of being abusive or committing extrajudicial killings rarely face 
punishment because Honduran judicial and security institutions are notoriously 
corrupt.67  
                                            
63 Ungar, “La Mano Dura,” 97. 
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C. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND MECHANISMS OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Honduran government efforts to effectively employ mano dura policies and 
reduce youth gang violence are a result of the inability of institutions, such as the 
criminal justice system, the penitentiary sector, and the national police, to 
perform their duties adequately. For the most part, these state institutions are 
consistently understaffed and underfunded to effectively train and prepare 
personnel to perform their necessary functions and address the security crisis.68 
For mano dura policies to succeed, it is necessary for a state to invest heavily in 
developing and training its personnel to aptly restore order without violating the 
human rights of its citizens. Strong-arm and zero-tolerance policies require 
extensive training of personnel, institutional mechanisms of accountability, and 
improved capacities for courts and prisons to process prisoners. Without these 
measures in place, a state could exacerbate the situation by permitting unfit 
institutions to violate the rights of individuals through repressive tactics and 
ineffective judicial procedures.69 According to Todd Landman, “The obligation to 
respect human rights requires the state and all its organs and agents to abstain 
from carrying out, sponsoring, tolerating any practice, policy, or legal measure 
that violates the integrity of individuals or impinges on their freedom to access 
resources to satisfy their needs.”70 Unfortunately for the citizens of Honduras, the 
national security, penal, and judicial institutions have failed to make the 
safeguarding of their civil and human rights their primary responsibility.  
1. The Honduran Public Ministry  
The Honduran Public Ministry, which role is similar to the U.S. Office of 
the Attorney General, has struggled to ensure that the nation’s security policies 
preserve the constitutional rights of the Honduran citizens. For many years, the 
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public ministry has been extremely weak in carrying out its duties as the national 
ombudsman. Consistently, the public ministry has lacked the fiscal resources 
necessary to hire and develop a trustworthy staff of professional prosecutors to 
fill critical positions throughout the nation. Honduras has among the lowest levels 
of prosecutor-to-inhabitant ratios in Latin America, which currently stands at 6.4 
prosecutors for every 100,000 citizens.71 With so few prosecutors within its 
ranks, the public ministry lacks the necessary manpower to investigate and 
prosecute criminal cases. Most notably, it is unable to act as a watchdog to 
ensure state actors neither behave illegally nor violate the civil and legal rights of 
imprisoned youths. As recent as June 2013, the head of the Honduran Public 
Ministry, Attorney General Luis Alberto Rubi, resigned under pressure from civil 
society groups and members of congress, who accused the ministry of 
incompetence and corruption.72 
The public ministry’s continued support of ineffective zero-tolerance 
policies highlights its greatest weakness. Rather than being an advocate for the 
rule of law and the ethical prosecution of criminal actors, the public ministry has 
supported policies that are discriminatory and overly repressive, especially 
toward Honduran youth. With the support of the public ministry, government 
officials were able to sanction laws that permitted security personal to actively 
target youth gangs and enter private homes without requiring search warrants 
(Presidential Decree 123–2002), expand the role of the military in support of 
police anti-gang functions (Honduras Segura), and authorize the sentencing of 
youths with prison sentenced of 6–12 years for being members of a gang (Ley 
Anti-Maras). Through the provisions of these laws, the national police gained full 
authorization to incarcerate young men and women without judicial orders. As a 
result, police officers gained the authority to detain thousands of young adults 
without needing to provide any proof of them committing a single criminal act. 
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The mere perception that a youth may potentially commit a crime or have an 
association with a gang was sufficient grounds for police officers to make an 
arrest. The public ministry’s inability to act as a mechanism of horizontal 
accountability permitted state officials to implement policies that completely 
disregarded the civil rights of individuals.73  
2. The Honduran Justice System 
As a result of the massive enforcement efforts against youth gangs, the 
Honduran Justice System has been overwhelmed with hundreds of youths held 
in pre-trial detention centers waiting to have their cases heard before a judge. In 
most instances, detainees wait several months for their court dates to arrive due 
to the enormous backlog of cases. According to 2004 figures, 90 percent of the 
Honduran prison population has remained incarcerated without being 
sentenced.74 Prior to having passed public security policies that were reliant on 
high incarceration rates, the Honduran government should had taken preliminary 
measures to ensure that it possessed sufficient trial judges to prevent 
bottlenecks within the judicial process. 
The Honduran justice system also suffers from an extreme lack of 
credibility. The Honduran public is wary of their justice system for they perceive 
that judges are ineffective at processing cases, make judicial rulings that are 
politically biased, and are prone to be highly corrupt. Since all Honduran judges 
gain their positions through political appointments, their rulings tend to align with 
the party leaders who appoint them.75 In an effort to promote judicial 
independence of the courts, the Honduran government needs to reform the 
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justice system so that judges assume office by way of an electoral process rather 
than through political appointments.76 A stark example of the lack of judicial 
independence within the Honduran Judicial System occurred in late 2012. In this 
case, the Honduran National Congress fired four Supreme Court Judges for not 
ruling in their favor in a decision involving the national police.77 It is essential that 
judges regain the confidence of the public. Youth have no incentives to be less 
violent or reduce their levels of criminality when they know judges will sentence 
them to long prison sentences regardless of the severity of their crimes.  
3. Honduran Prisons 
The Honduran penitentiary system is in a dire state of disrepair. As a 
result of mano dura policies, Honduran prisons have become overpopulated with 
youth prisoners yet dangerously understaffed to effectively secure the growing 
number of detainees. Undermanned prisons have become death traps and gang 
controlled zones rather than serving as facilities to promote the rehabilitation of 
juvenile offenders. Once in prison, youths become vulnerable to being killed by 
fellow prisoners, contracting diseases, suffering hunger, and likely of having their 
civil and lawful rights violated by state officials.78 In 2004, the Honduran prison 
system employed fewer than 1,300 prison guards to supervise all 24 national 
detention centers. With an extremely large prison population, each prison guard 
was responsible for supervising more than 130 inmates.79 Within the last ten 
years, prison overpopulation has ballooned even further. As recently as January 
2013, the Honduran federal prisons held over 12,000 prisoners. Since Honduras 
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only has the space to house 8,120 prisoners, this prison population exceeded the 
national prison capacity by over 50 percent.80 
Since prison authorities lack the capacity to establish order and provide 
basic services to inmates, MS-13 and Barrio 18 gang leaders fill the state’s void. 
These gangs have become so powerful and dominant of the Honduran prison 
system that they determine which areas prison guards have access to and which 
prisons inmates get assigned to. Due to the state’s lack of control, members of 
the violent transnational gangs are the ones that end up filling the roles as 
administrators of the Honduran prisons. Within the prison walls, gang leaders are 
the only ones capable of imposing their authority and determining which inmates 
have access to essential services. For this reason, new inmates have no other 
choice but to become affiliated with the major prison gangs to gain access to 
food, protection, and suitable shelter. In essence, the prisons have become an 
extension of the territory gangs control within Honduras.81  
To regain control of the gang-dominated prisons, the Honduran 
government passed the Penitentiary System Law in 2012. With the new law, 
state officials are reforming the national penitentiary system and working toward 
improving prison conditions. As part of the penitentiary law, the government 
transferred control of the prison system from the national police to the newly 
created National Penitentiary Institute. The new law no longer permits the 
mixture of unsentenced detainees, which had predominantly consisted of youths, 
to live alongside hardened criminals. The law establishes that prisoners be 
secured in facilities that correspond to their length of sentences. For instance, the 
state will now hold persons in pre-trial confinement in establishment centers, 
prisoners facing short sentences in local prisons, prisoners sentenced to less 
than three years in departmental prisons, and felons with sentences greater than 
three years in the national penitentiary centers. The Penitentiary System Law will 
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also require that the state provide one prison guard for every 11 inmates.82 The 
improved law and segregation of prisoners should improve efforts to rehabilitate 
juveniles convicted of minor offenses. 
4. Security and Police Institutions 
For mano dura policies to succeed, the state needs to ensure that police 
forces are adequately trained and professionalized. Furthermore, oversight 
mechanisms must be in place to make certain that police officers operate within 
the national legal framework and are promptly punished for all instances of 
abuse. Without the establishment of a well-trained police force and systems of 
accountability, police officers are prone to perform in an overly repressive 
manner and remain unconcerned about respecting citizens’ civil rights.83 
Regrettably for the Honduran youth population, politicians and judicial institutions 
enacted mano dura and zero-tolerance policies without properly professionalizing 
and developing the national police force. Under pressure from politicians, police 
units have the immense task of restoring security and ending youth gang 
violence without receiving adequate training, budgets, and equipment to meet 
their mission requirements. As a result, Honduran police officers have been inept 
at restoring security since the implementation of mano dura.84 
The lack of state investment in professionalizing and improving the 
patrolling capacities of the national police has contributed to an increase in 
repressive police tactics. In their efforts to implement mano dura objectives, 
mass raids, forced confessions, and indiscriminate arrests of youths have 
become standard practices. Increased training and oversight mechanisms are 
necessary to reduce the high incidences of police abuse directed toward 
juveniles. Nevertheless, neither state nor senior police officials have taken the 
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necessary measures to improve the effectiveness and quality of the Honduran 
police.85  
Besides being overly repressive, Honduran civil society groups and 
human rights organizations consistently denounce the national police for being 
corrupt. Highly attributed to the low wages, police officers, at all institutional 
levels, have become involved with drug trafficking organizations and other 
criminal enterprises. Honduran police officers have also been implicated with 
various crimes to include non-judicial homicides, briberies, and robberies. To 
reduce corruption, the Ministry of Security needs to implement improved vetting 
mechanisms to verify that they are admitting high quality professionals into the 
ranks of the national police.86 In 2013, the average monthly salary for 83 percent 
of the police officers in the Honduran National Police was $472.87 Even for 
Honduran standards, $472 a month is not a sufficient salary to properly provide 
for a family. To improve the quality of police officers, the state needs to provide 
greater monetary incentives and improved work conditions to decrease police 
officers vulnerabilities toward becoming corrupt and developing unethical 
behaviors. 
In May 2012, the Honduran legislature passed the Police Purging Law to 
grant the Ministry of Security the authority to dismiss police officers suspected of 
being corrupt and having close ties to criminal organizations.88 However, most 
efforts by the state to rid the national police of corrupt police officers have been 
poorly executed and overly politicized. Among the greatest criticisms of the 
purging law is that high level officials within the police and the justice sector 
instructions have used the law as a tool to remove unwanted low level police 
officers and give the perception that the Ministry of Security is being proactive in 
regulating and strengthening its police force. In December 2013, the purging law 
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came under attack when the media reported that countless police officers, known 
for their diligent dedication and professionalism toward their police work, had 
fallen victims to the purges.89 The public perceived the government’s dubious 
purges of uncorrupt officials as a major step backwards toward professionalizing 
and cleaning the national police. Corrupt senior officials fired respectable police 
officers that had received extensive U.S. police training and had demonstrated 
the ability to pass all the U.S. Embassy administered background checks and 
vetting procedures. Conversely, the Purging Law has failed to effectively 
scrutinize the practices of senior police officials, whom Honduran civil society 
groups suspect of being the biggest perpetrators of police corruption. The 
distorted application of the Police Purging Law has only served to further weaken 
the national police and dilute the public’s confidence toward their security 
institutions.90  
5. Militarized Policing 
Since the Honduran public lives in a constant state of fear of falling victim 
to youth gang violence, the nation has become accepting of the increasing 
encroachment of the military’s role in internal security matters. Apart from fearing 
youth gangs, the public also distrusts the Honduran National Police. In contrast, 
the public has greater confidence in the Honduran Armed Forces’ abilities to 
restore order due to their superior professionalism, legitimacy, and training. 
Growing concerns of the police ability to restore public order and reduce internal 
corruption has prompted the Honduran government to expand the role of the 
military in internal security matters. The view of citizens and political leaders is 
that authorizing the military to assume internal security functions is necessary to 
overcome the high levels of youth gang violence and delinquency. Given the 
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national police’s current ineffectual status, the public and the government 
perceive the military’s involvement as a public necessity.91  
Using the military to support the police is not a new concept in Honduras. 
Since 2002, the Honduran government has regularly authorized the military to 
reinforce police anti-gang operations and neighborhood patrols. However, the 
military in support of police operations are only effective at providing immediate, 
short-term relief. Since military forces are neither designed nor trained to conduct 
police functions, governments should not become overly reliant on them to serve 
as an additional arm of the police. Furthermore, past use of the military to 
support mano dura policies have led to abuse and overuse of aggressive military 
tactics against juvenile gangs and petty criminals.92 
Nevertheless, the current administration of President Juan Orlando 
Hernández has continued to advocate for sustained militarization of the national 
police. Upon assuming office, President Hernandez expanded heavily militarized 
police units known as the Tropa de Investigación y Grupo de Respuesta Especial 
de Seguridad, TIGRES (Special Intelligence and Security Response Troops). 
Although they are a civilian police force, TIGRES units are different in that they 
possess advanced weapon systems, receive military training, and conduct high-
risk counternarcotic and anti-gang operations. Through their tactical superiority, 
TIGRES enhances the capacity of the national police to establish control of gang 
ridden Honduran neighborhoods. However, the numbers of trained TIGRES 
remain minimal so are unlikely to make a major contribution toward 
reestablishing public security in the near future.93  
With the passing of the Military Cooperation in Pubic Security Law in 
2013, the Honduran legislature authorized the armed forces to grow by 5,000 
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troops to establish the Policía Militar de Orden Público.94 Military Police units, 
which the Ministry of Security does not control, are trained and equipped to 
conduct internal security operations alongside the national police. Military Police 
troops accompany policemen on joint patrols but defer all arresting procedures to 
the police officer on the scene.95  
President Hernandez’s 2015 appointment of Army General Julian 
Pacheco to Minister of Security further highlights the militarization of the 
Honduran public security institutions. Unlike his predecessors, President 
Hernandez chose to appoint an active duty military officer rather than a civilian. 
The president’s decision was based on his aspiration to instill military ethos, 
professionalism, and expertise within the national police. Although General 
Pacheco resigned his military commission prior to assuming office, he was the 
first active duty military officer selected to lead the institution responsible for 
overseeing the internal security of the nation.96 Apart from undermining the 
democratic advancement of civilian leadership, the selection of a military officer 
to lead the Ministry of Security conflicts with Constitutional Decree 155–98. The 
1998 decree established the Ministry of Security with the sole purpose of 
separating the national police from the influence and control of the Honduran 
Armed Forces.97 
The long-term reliance on military personnel to support policing functions 
has undermined the development of an already weak police force. In an effort to 
equip and train military soldiers to perform police functions, the Honduran 
legislature has diverted funds from the national police to militarized policing. 
Rather, the state could have used desperately needed resources to hire more 
police officers or train and equip more police units. Nevertheless, the Honduran 
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government continues to expand the military’s policing capacities during a period 
when police officers find themselves scrounging and stealing to acquire essential 
equipment. State endeavors to professionalize and improve the crime-prevention 
capacities of the national police will remain unsuccessful as long as the 
Honduran government continues to expand the internal security roles and 
functions of the military.98  
D. HONDURAN NON-REPRESSIVE APPROACHES  
Within the last 15 years, the Honduran government has also sought less 
suppressive methods to address its youth violence crisis. The administration of 
President Carlos Roberto Flores (1998–2002) first sought to reduce the 
proliferation of violence by promoting gang prevention programs for the 
Honduran youth. Prior to leaving office, President Flores was successful in 
passing Law 141–2001 that established a prevention-based strategy. The 
passage of this law gave way to Programa Nacional de Prevención y Reinserción 
Social de Personas Vinculadas a Pandillas (PNPRRS) (National Program of 
Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Social Reintegration). PNPRRS served as the 
governmental body with the capacity to coordinate national and international 
efforts to educate at-risk youth and their families. Its collaboration with 
international organizations like the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
addresses the social and economic ills confronting disenfranchised Honduran 
youth. By promoting the efforts of PNPRRS, the Honduran government 
expanded its capacity to work with youth vulnerable to gangs and to help those 
seeking to leave the gang lifestyle. PNPRRS also reinforced state and NGO 
efforts to provide young adults access to programs that promote education, gang 
prevention, poverty alleviation, and jobs training.99  
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During the administration of President Manuel Zelaya (2006–2009), the 
Honduran government also implemented more comprehensive approaches to 
reduce the sources of national violence. Zelaya promoted government-sponsored 
social programs to target the root causes compelling young children and 
juveniles to join the crime-centric maras and youth gangs. While in office, Zelaya 
increased the incorporation of prevention and rehabilitation programs within the 
national police anti-gang strategy. He also made efforts to reduce reliance on 
repressive policing advocated through the mano dura policies. To support his 
anti-gang prevention strategy, Zelaya expanded the incorporation of community 
police units under the newly established Gang Prevention Division of the national 
police.100  
Since its implementation, the Honduran Community Police force has 
sought to improve their partnerships with the communities they serve. To reduce 
youth violence and gang memberships, the community police have created 
various anti-gang prevention programs, especially designed to influence and 
inspire elementary-age children and their parents. Police officers trained as 
instructors and prevention counselors aim to dissuade school-age children from 
joining gangs by registering them in anti-gang programs such as Educación para 
Resistir y Evitar las Maras (EREM) (Education to Resist and Avoid the Maras). 
These programs have tremendous potential to enlighten young children about 
the life-long implications from choosing to join a gang and engage in a life of 
crime. However, the success of the community police anti-gang programs is 
heavily dependent on a limited government budget. Since community police 
programs are less of a priority, only a small number of Honduran children have 
been able to participate in programs such as EREM.101 
Various NGOs and religious organizations are also playing a vital role in 
implementing gang prevention programs for at-risk Honduran youth. These 
organizations are highly critical of the state’s inclination to apply repression 
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policies, especially when they hold state officials responsible for promoting 
policies that have resulted in the widespread poverty and academic 
underperformance of Honduran youth. As such, they have sought to resolve the 
economic, academic, and vocational tribulations compelling Honduran youth to 
join maras. By working directly with gang members and imprisoned juveniles, 
NGOs and church organizations strive to address the root causes that are 
impeding marginalized youth from sustaining normal livelihoods. Apart from gang 
prevention programs, these organizations are providing drug addiction 
counseling, job training, and adult education classes to youth gang members.102 
The Honduran penal system has also established programs to promote 
the rehabilitation and social reintegration of youth serving long prison sentences. 
With the resources and assistance of PNPRRS and UNICEF, the Honduran 
penitentiary system is in a better position to provide training and educational 
opportunities to imprisoned youth. While in prison, youth have access to job 
training workshops and primary education classes to improve their opportunities 
to become productive members to society when they complete their prison 
sentences. By engaging incarcerated youth, PNPRRS recognizes that young 
adults are less likely to continue their past criminal and violent behaviors if they 
gain valuable job skills in prison. Penal education programs also aim to offset the 
lack of schooling that Honduran youth lacked prior to becoming gang members 
and entering prison. Education and rehabilitation programs are essential tools to 
end the vicious cycle of criminality that Honduran youth are experiencing. By 
learning vital life and works skills, youths are able to become members of the 
national workforce and gain honest means of earning money. More importantly, 
they are an effective approach to preventing youth from returning to a life 
dependent of gangs and violence.103  
Job training and education programs are essential to providing youth an 
alternative to leading lives as gang members. Many gang members find it difficult 
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to leave a gang when they reach their adult years. Since youth tend to join gangs 
in their early teens, they lack marketable job skills by the time they reach their 20 
years of age. Through the jobs and education programs that NGOs provide, 
young adults can break their dependence on gangs and criminality to make 
money.104 However, the success of these programs, to reduce gang 
membership, has remained minimal in Honduras. Very little coordination, 
collaboration, and planning exists between NGOs and church organization in 
implementing their programs. Furthermore, collaboration with state and police 
organization has also been marginal. In effort for these programs to have lasting 
effects, extensive coordination and planning must exist between the NGOs, 
religious organizations, and government agencies. The NGO sponsored anti-
gang programs have the opportunity to achieve long term success, only if they 
can improve their ability to work in partnership and reinforce their efforts with the 
state.105  
Nevertheless, the Honduran government has struggled to garner the 
political and societal support to make prevention and rehabilitation programs a 
priority. The Honduran government has continued to have a preference toward 
repression based mano dura policies since they provide a possibility of bringing a 
quick and easy end to the youth gang problem. Unfortunately, youth rehabilitation 
and reintegration programs remain severely underfunded in Honduras even 
though they are an effective approach to drawing kids away from gangs. 
Ultimately, prevention and rehabilitation programs such as PNPRRS, community 
policing, penal vocational training, and NGO education programs have had 
limited success in reducing youth violence in Honduras.106 
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E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Honduras’ mano dura polices have failed to restore the public security of 
the nation and address the core issues leading to the proliferation of youth 
violence. Thirteen years after its implementation, Honduras maintains its position 
as the most violent country in the world.107 Mano dura has failed to deter 
Honduran youth from joining gangs and participating in a criminal lifestyle. 
Marginalized youth continue to join the large transnational gangs due to the 
state’s inability to address the mounting socioeconomic difficulties confronting the 
poorest sectors of the Honduran society. Rather than restoring security, 
Honduras repressive approach has intensified the problem because subjugated 
gang members have become more violent and resilient to government 
suppression. Repression alone will not solve Honduras’ problems.108 
Mano dura has not succeeded because institutional weakness continues 
to persist within the Honduran National Police, penitentiary services, and the 
criminal justice system. Partly due to corruption and the overwhelming lack of 
professionalism, Honduran institutions continue to be inadequately administered 
and staffed with untrained and poorly educated personnel. If the Honduran 
government wants to restore public security and reduce youth violence, it needs 
to develop its policing and criminal justice institutions to respect and protect the 
human rights of its citizens. The national police and the criminal justice sector 
must have improved systems of oversight to ensure corrupt and brutal officials 
are held accountable for their illegal and brutal acts against youths that may be 
associated with gangs. If state agencies continue to violate the civil liberties of its 
youth and fail to implement mechanisms of accountability to control corrupt state 
officials, the Honduran government will not be able to control the expansion of 
youth violence.109 Honduran security policymakers can enhance their ability to 
                                            
107 UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2013, 126. 
108 Jütersonke et al., “Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions,” 391. 
109 Landman, “Violence, Democracy, and Human Rights in Latin America,” 235–7. 
 41 
confront youth violence by seeking to understand the sources contributing to 
youth violence rather insisting on the continued suppression of youth gangs.110  
The government can advance its anti-gang efforts by committing the 
national police ability to build better community relations, rather than further 
militarize Honduran anti-gang efforts. The national police require added state 
investment to professionalize and improve the training of existing police forces. 
Rather than investing funds to integrate more military soldiers and TIGRES 
elements to confront youth gangs, political leaders should seek to improve the 
investigative capacity and effectiveness of existing police units. Although the 
militarization of the police can provide immediate short-term results, a long term 
solution necessitates regular police officers solve crimes and build better 
relations with the communities they serve. Continued militarization of the national 
anti-gang strategy will only serve to delay badly needed reforms for the national 
police and create more hostile relations between the state and already 
marginalized youth.111 
Government anti-gang efforts need to expand their prevention and 
intervention programs to engage at-risk youth before they join gangs or commit 
crimes. Since many NGOs and church organization are already delivering 
prevention and rehabilitation programs, the Honduran government can help 
improve coordination among organizations to enlarge the numbers of youth that 
can benefit. NGOs have done tremendous work in helping rehabilitate gang 
members in and out of jails. By working closely with NGOs, the government can 
help provide education, training, and incentives for youths to leave their gangs 
and end their cycle of incarcerations.112 
Enacting the right policy to address youth violence in Honduras will require 
the government’s commitment to develop a long term comprehensive strategy. 
                                            
110 Mark Ungar, Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin 
America (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 102. 
111 Korthuis, “CARSI in Honduras,” 181–2. 
112 Mateo, “Street Gangs of Honduras,” 101–102. 
 42 
As policymakers have observed within the last 15 years, zero-tolerance 
repression policies have failed to bring an end to youth violence and improve 
public security. Policymakers need to expand police capabilities to solve and 
prevent crimes, while also helping improve the socio-economic factors inhibiting 
Honduran youth from becoming productive, law-abiding citizens. Honduran youth 
can attain a chance at a better future, if the government can provide programs 
that help reduce extreme poverty and ensure they are able to achieve a high 
school education. The youth of Honduras will have less of a need to rely on 
criminality and violence to survive if they view their government as a vested 
partner willing to help them learn the skills and education for a better future.113 
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III. NICARAGUA 
Similar to Honduras, Nicaragua is a Central American nation that has 
extensive poverty, poor education systems, youth gang problems, and a long 
history of violent internal conflicts. Strikingly, the incidence of youth violence and 
homicides in Nicaragua are substantially less than in Honduras. In the early 90s, 
incidents of youth violence soared throughout the country soon after the 
Nicaraguan civil war ended. However, extensive police reforms and proactive 
government efforts to reduce youth violence decreased national homicide rates 
by half within a ten year period.114 A 2013 U.N. study demonstrated that 
Nicaragua now ranks among the safest countries in the world, with only 11 
homicides per 100,000 people.115 The fact that the Nicaraguan government has 
been able to reduce gang violence and maintain low levels is a major 
accomplishment. Unlike Honduras, the Nicaraguan government reduced its 
national homicide rates by implementing domestic security policies that required 
neither military participation nor large-scale repressive approaches against youth 
gangs. Through state collaboration with programs sponsored by NGOs, 
Nicaraguan youth gang members have greater opportunities to leave their gangs 
and become productive citizens.116 The Nicaraguan government has been 
successful in addressing youth violence because it has built stronger criminal 
justice institutions and has implemented a community-oriented security strategy 
that addresses the socioeconomic challenges confronting Nicaraguan youth.117 
This chapter examines the Nicaraguan government’s efforts to promote 
community policing, strengthen its criminal justice institutions, and integrate NGO 
programs to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the youth population. The 
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first section provides an overview of how youth violence surged toward the end of 
the Nicaraguan civil war. The next section explains how the Nicaraguan 
government has relied on non-repressive anti-gang policies to reduce youth 
violence and gang criminality. Section three highlights the public security reforms 
the Nicaraguan government undertook to strengthen its criminal justice 
institutions and augment their mechanisms of accountability. Section four 
elaborates on the significant roles international organizations and NGOs have 
played in supporting Nicaraguan preventative and rehabilitative strategies. The 
chapter concludes with findings and recommendations for improving the 
Nicaraguan approach for reducing youth violence.  
A. POST CONFLICT CONSTRUCTION OF NICARAGUAN YOUTH GANGS 
For the greater part of the 20th century, social violence prevailed in 
Nicaragua. In a dictatorship spanning 43 years, the brutal Somoza family 
dominated Nicaraguan society and government. Ultimately in 1979, 
revolutionaries of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, also known as 
Sandinistas or FSLN, succeeded in toppling the Somoza regime and establishing 
a socialist government after more than 20 years of guerilla warfare. However, the 
defeat of the Somoza regime gave way to 20 more years of violence as a 
devastating civil war ensued between the Sandinistas forces and the U.S.-
supported Contras militias. Through the extensive support of the international 
community in helping negotiate a peace and the FSLN defeat in the presidential 
election to Violeta Chamorro, the Nicaraguan civil war ended in 1990. Although 
the war was finally over, Nicaraguan society continued to live in a state of 
perpetual fear due to the violence and criminality that ensued in the post war.118 
As noted by Nicaraguan citizen, Luis Fanor Hernandez, the nation descended 
into a state of paralysis due to the proliferation of youth violence, especially 
within the nation’s capital of Managua: 
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“The war is over in Nicaragua, we’re at peace now” … that’s what 
[government officials] say, but have you seen how we live? Look at 
what’s happening in this country, all this delinquency, all this crime 
… People are scared, everybody lives barricaded in their homes 
because it’s so dangerous … You can get killed for almost 
anything—money, jewellery (sic), your watch, but also your clothes, 
your shoes, or even for just looking at somebody the wrong way … 
It’s like this everywhere, in all the poor neighborhoods … I tell you, 
this isn’t peace, its war; we’re living in the middle of a war again … 
The only difference with the past is that this war is no longer 
happening in the mountains, but right here, in the city.119 
When the civil war ended, thousands of demobilized Sandinistas and 
Contra soldiers merged to form armed criminal gangs that looted and terrorized 
the Nicaraguan cities. These gangs, known as pandillas, consisted primarily of 
youth since most combatants were young teenagers when they had been 
conscripted to fight. Criminal violence surged because the national economy was 
in ruins and the postwar government struggled to reintegrate former soldiers into 
society. Without jobs or homes to return to, gangs of demobilized troops began to 
raid and plunder as their primary means of survival. Making matters worse, the 
criminal gangs had the capacity for extreme violence since most members had 
extensive combat experience and were heavily armed with military weapons and 
ammunition.120 A great portion of the demobilized troops were also unable to 
gain employment after the war because they lacked marketable job skills. Many 
of the former fighters developed into young adults knowing only how to conduct 
guerilla combat operations and how to obtain their necessities through violence. 
For the remainder of the decade, neighborhoods had to form their own vigilante 
protection gangs to protect residents from outsiders. Violence and homicide rates 
surged throughout the nation as vigilante neighborhood gangs killed and 
mutilated strangers whom they believed were rival gang members with intentions 
to steal inside their neighborhoods.121 
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Nicaraguan youth gangs emerged as the primary providers of 
neighborhood authority, security, and subsistence. Although most gangs were 
protective of the neighborhoods to which they belonged, it was common for them 
to enter other neighborhoods to steal, beat, and kill rivals. As the Nicaraguan 
government struggled to provide security and improve the economy, 
neighborhood gangs continued to grow in strength and numbers. Especially 
within the poorest neighborhoods, boys as young as seven years old would leave 
school to join neighborhood youth gangs. Just like their predecessors, young, 
uneducated kids were learning to become criminals to help provide for and 
violently protect their struggling neighborhoods. According to national police 
figures, Nicaragua had over 110 gangs and more than 8,500 youth gang 
members by the end of the decade. Although the national police was notorious 
for underreporting the severity of the gang crisis throughout the 90s, these 
measures still represented a 500 percent growth within a ten year period.122 
When drug consumption began to increase within the Nicaraguan youth 
population, the role of gangs as guardians of the neighborhoods began to 
deteriorate. As youth became addicted to crack-cocaine, crime and violence 
began to soar throughout Nicaragua. Neighborhood residents who were once 
thankful for the protection youth gangs provided soon began to fear them. Local 
residents became the easiest targets for youths to assault and rob in order to buy 
more drugs. As the incidence of crack-cocaine use increased, so did the 
incidents of assault, rape, and homicides.123 Drug consumption also contributed 
to the escalation of violence and hostility between rival youth gangs. Within the 
most dangerous neighborhoods of Nicaragua, youth gangs were responsible for 
over 60 percent of crime-related killings.124 
Although public security had deteriorated to dangerous levels throughout 
the country, the postwar Nicaraguan government was committed to addressing 
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the socioeconomic problems compelling youth to resort to violence and 
criminality. Nicaraguan public security institutions and civil society became active 
partners with the state to reduce the national homicide rates and improve the 
conditions inflicted on the youth population. By the end of the decade, the 
Nicaraguan government and society were able to cut the national homicide rates 
in half (see Figure 3).  




B. ADDRESSING THE POSTWAR SURGE IN YOUTH VIOLENCE 
After the Nicaraguan civil war ended, the government made it a priority to 
reduce the number of unregistered weapons that remained dispersed throughout 
the country. The availability of uncollected civil war weapons was contributing 
greatly to the surge in firearm-related homicides and armed robberies. Weapons 
were widely available everywhere in Nicaragua because the Sandinistas and the 
Contras forces had supplied large quantities of weapons to any willing, fighting 
citizen during the war. As a consequence, millions of unaccounted weapons 
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remained at the disposal for anyone to use, including youth gangs. To diminish 
the overabundance of guns, the national police relied on gun turn-in programs to 
collect and destroy firearms throughout the country. By reducing the number of 
available weapons, the Nicaraguan government sought to reduce the number of 
gun-related homicides and crimes.126 
The widespread availability of military weapons also created conditions in 
which youth gangs and other criminal organizations had the capacity to out-gun 
most police units. Without much effort, youth gangs could acquire weapons, such 
as handguns, assault rifles, and hand grenades that still remained scattered and 
easily accessible. Since weapon availability has been a common problem 
throughout Central America, Northern Triangle countries have used this as a 
pretext to militarize their anti-gang policing strategies. However, the Nicaraguan 
National Police has continued to work toward building trusting relations with its 
communities to make the gun turn-in programs a success. As a result, thousands 
of citizens have voluntarily relinquished their weapons to the various national 
turn-in programs. Within the last 25 years, these programs have made it possible 
for the national police to destroy hundreds of thousands of weapons that were 
once in the hands of youth gangs and criminal organizations.127  
The Nicaraguan gun turn-in programs greatly reduced the number of 
weapons available for citizens and youth gangs to commit homicides and armed 
robberies. The programs have been so successful that Nicaragua is now a global 
leader in weapons collection and destruction, helping the country become one of 
the safest in Central America.128 To this day, the public continues to support 
national police efforts to reduce the number of illicit weapons on the streets. The 
public has been instrumental in providing police information that has led to the 
seizure of thousands of weapons. Public provided information has enabled police 
units to conduct raids and searches of criminal gangs suspected of possessing 
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vast arsenals of illegal weapons. Between 2008 and 2013, the national police 
seized nearly 20,000 illegal weapons, such as handguns, machineguns, 
shotguns, rifles, and grenades.129 
1. Improving Institutional Capacity  
A major reason Nicaragua was successful in addressing the surge in 
youth violence in the postwar period was that it made it a priority to build stronger 
and more accountable criminal justice institutions. The fact that Nicaragua was 
emerging from a civil war and undergoing a complete government transition 
facilitated the process of implementing major reforms. The democratic electoral 
removal of the Sandinista National Liberation Front government paved the way 
for Nicaraguans to construct government institutions from the bottom up and 
implement public security reforms that were more responsive to the needs of civil 
society. The 1990 reforms produced security institutions that respected the rule 
of law, coordinated with community organizations, and confronted rising 
criminality with greater capacity. Following the post-transition reforms, 
Nicaraguan security institutions emerged with improved capacity to control the 
issues that had stimulated youth violence.130 
A positive shift toward improving the Nicaraguan security structure 
occurred when Violeta Chamorro defeated Daniel Ortega in the 1990 presidential 
election. Upon taking office, Chamorro was influential in bringing about positive 
changes within the public security institutions.131 Her collaboration with 
international organizations, opposition civil society groups, and the Unidad 
Nicaragüense Opositora (National Opposition Union) political party, helped 
dissolve the FSLN-dominated security and military institutions of Nicaragua. 
Chamorro was able to establish new institutions in which security actors were 
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subordinated to their democratically elected leaders, professionalized, and 
depoliticized. With the introduction of effective public security reforms and the 
depoliticization of the national security apparatuses, the Ministry of Interior 
(MIGOB), the Nicaraguan National Police, and the army gained greater 
autonomy and capacity to meet the security needs of the nation.132 
The Nicaraguan government devoted the entire decade of the 90s to 
strengthening and reforming its security and criminal justice institutions. To 
support the extensive process of professionalizing the Nicaraguan national 
security forces, the United Nations oversaw the demobilization of the Sandinista 
Police and the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS). Following negotiations between 
the FSLN and the Chamorro administration, former members of the Sandinista 
Police and the EPS became integrated into the newly established National Police 
and National Army. To date, the Nicaraguan security and criminal justice 
institutions remain in a continuous state of modernization. In particular, state 
modernization efforts remain focused on expanding community policing 
strategies and gang prevention programs.133 What emerged from the exhaustive 
efforts of the Nicaraguan government and the international community was a 
more legitimate and respected public security structure.134 By the end of the 90s, 
the Nicaragua reforms were foundational in reducing the national homicide rates 
and transforming Nicaragua from a war-torn, crime-ridden nation to one of the 
safest countries in Central America (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.  Homicide Rates in Central America, 2000–2012135 
 
 
2. Enduring Gang Prevention Efforts  
To confront youth violence, the Nicaraguan government has preferred to 
implement anti-gang policies that are geared toward promoting gang prevention 
and improving community relations. In contrast to Northern Triangle countries, 
Nicaraguan policymakers are disinclined to promote policing programs that rely 
on domestic repression, police militarization, and mass incarcerations of gang 
members. Through the 1990s, Nicaraguan officials were proactive in working 
with disenfranchised youth and providing them the social support necessary to 
prevent gang involvement. Rather than treating youth gang members as social 
pariahs who threatened public security, Nicaraguan officials viewed gang 
members as rebellious youngsters who required guidance from the state and the 
community. As such, criminal justice institutions have integrated the support of 
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religious organizations, NGOs, and civil society groups to work with at-risk youth 
and promote community-centric prevention programs.136 
During the period other Central American countries were adopting mano 
dura polices, Nicaragua was implementing laws and creating institutions that 
promoted the welfare and legal rights of children. During the presidency of 
Arnoldo Aleman (1997–2001), the Nicaraguan government adopted the Code of 
Childhood and Adolescence (1998), the Law for the Promotion of the Integral 
Development of Youth (2001), and the National Plan for the Integral 
Development of Youth (2001). In 2000, the legislature also authorized the 
formation of the national Ombudsman for the Child and Adolescent (2000) to 
safeguard the constitutional rights of Nicaraguan youths. The new office of the 
Secretary of Youth (2002) further promoted state efforts to address the 
socioeconomic challenges impeding the social development of Nicaraguan 
youth. The amalgam of these laws and institutions reinforced the Nicaraguan 
government’s commitment to protecting young people’s constitutional rights and 
promoting their development as citizens. Of equal significance, these laws and 
institutions reflected the government’s aspirations to prevent the expansion of 
juvenile delinquency.137 
Gang prevention programs have contributed significantly to the 
Nicaraguan government’s ability to address youth violence. Since the 1990s, 
various presidential administrations have supported the National Police adoption 
of prevention programs. President Enrique Bolaños (2002–2006) was among the 
avid supporters of prevention-based youth programs. In an effort to transform 
Nicaragua into one of the safest countries in Latin America, President Bolaños 
welcomed the support of both international organizations and NGOs to support 
the development of a prevention-based gang strategy. By collaborating with 
these organizations, President Bolaños was able to provide his criminal justice 
organizations the necessary resources to expand their support to at-risk youth. 
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The success that gang prevention programs have achieved over the last decade 
has reinforced Bolaños’ goal of making Nicaragua one of the safest countries in 
Latin America and having the international community recognize that 
achievement.138 
3. Community-Oriented Policing 
The centerpiece for the Nicaraguan National Police strategy to reduce 
juvenile delinquency and promote the social reintegration of gang-members is El 
Plan de Acción y Exposición ‘Policía-Comunidad’ (Community-Oriented Policing). 
Through the community-oriented policing strategy, Nicaraguan police units aim to 
reduce crime and reintegrate disenfranchised youth into society through gang 
prevention, rehabilitation, and community-building programs. An advantage to 
community policing is that it incorporates the support of community leaders and 
social service organizations to extend opportunities to at-risk youth. Rather than 
permitting NGOs and social organizations to provide piecemeal, disorganized 
support, community policing elements help coordinate their efforts to ensure their 
services reach the youth groups that need help the most. As a result of the 
community policing strategy, the Nicaraguan government has seen better results 
than Honduras in reducing youth criminal behavior and gang membership.139 
Policing elements that garner support and legitimacy from the 
communities they serve are better able to conduct their policing duties. By 
demonstrating that police officers can provide assistance and mentorship, 
citizens, and particularly the youth, see them as partners rather than oppressors. 
By building strong relationships within their communities, police officers are able 
to understand the hardships and concerns inflicting the local youth. As such, 
police officers are in a better position to coordinate between criminal justice 
agencies, local schools, and social services to provide greater support to youth. 
Furthermore, police officers that have strong community ties are less likely to 
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imprison youths who have associations with gangs. Through increased 
interaction, police officers are able to distinguish between youth gang members 
who have criminal inclinations and those who join for comradery. This has 
enabled police officers to provide assistance to at-risk youth and only arrest 
individuals who have committed crimes.140  
Nicaraguan police measure their success through the number of youths 
enrolled in prevention programs rather than focusing on youth gang incarceration 
rates. By working closely with communities that have a gang presence, police 
officers enable the youth to enroll in activities that reduce their susceptibility to 
gangs.141 Throughout the country, Nicaraguan police units sponsor sports 
tournaments and provide job training workshops to keep youngsters occupied 
and off the streets. Since the adoption of the Code of Childhood and 
Adolescence and the expansion of police prevention programs, the incidence of 
youth homicides and incarcerations of minors are continuing to decline. Apart 
from being highly popular among Nicaraguan youth, prevention programs claim 
to have decreased juvenile incarcerations by more than 90 percent.142 The 
Nicaraguan criminal justice institutions attribute much of this success to the 
efforts of the police prevention programs with at-risk youth. Although police 
organizations often inflate their statistics, these programs are providing at-risk 
youth desperately needed educational opportunities and training to develop vital 
work skills.143 
C. FURTHERING PROFESSIONALISM AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Compared to the rest of Central America, the Nicaraguan National Police 
has the smallest annual budget, the lowest number of police officers, and the 
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lowest monthly salary per police officer (see Table 3).144 Nevertheless, it is 
among the most successful police services in the region. A reason the 
Nicaraguan National Police has been effective in addressing its public security 
issues, considering its low budget and available personnel, is a testament to its 
culture of professionalism and accountability.145 
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To inculcate its police force with the culture of professionalism and to 
reinforce the merits of community policing, the Nicaraguan government invests 
heavily in the training and development of its police officers. The National Police 
Academy provides all police candidates extensive initial entry training to ensure 
they become well-versed in basic law enforcement responsibilities, the rule of 
law, and the community policing strategy. Police candidates have to complete 
nearly six months of training at the police academy to become members of the 
police force. Candidates who wish to become commissioned police officers and 
detectives have to complete a rigorous four-year degree program in police 
sciences at the National Police Academy. Nicaraguan police personnel then have 
to continue attending professional development training and education courses 
for the entirety of their careers to retain police credentials and ensure they learn 
the latest techniques in community policing. By providing extensive police 
training and education, the Nicaraguan government is able to develop a cadre of 
professionals who respect the constitutional rights of citizens, reject corruption, 
and commit to the community policing model.147 
The Nicaraguan National Police also has multiple layers of internal 
controls to ensure the discipline and accountability of its officers. Within the 
national police, three distinct entities for internal controls exist. At the lowest 
level, citizens who have police grievances can contact the office of the internal 
affairs of the national police to submit complaints about individuals demonstrating 
unethical police practices and abuses. The internal affairs office has the authority 
to investigate citizen complaints against all officers. If police officers are found 
guilty, the internal affairs office forwards administrative and disciplinary 
recommendations to the police national headquarters. The internal audit office 
and the general inspectorate also exist to carry out investigations on authorities 
and individuals suspected of major criminal behavior. Critical to these 
organizations is ensuring that the prestige of the national police is maintained 
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and that grievances from civilians are properly investigated and resolved. The 
general comptroller of the republic also functions as an external observer to 
regulate and monitor police behavior. With the employment of various oversight 
agencies, the national police are able to ensure the discipline and good 
performance of its organization is maintained.148 By applying these measures of 
control and accountability, the national police can help maintain high levels of 
trust within their communities. To maintain trusting relationships with juveniles, 
internal oversight mechanisms help certify that police officers perform their duties 
with respect and professionalism.  
Nicaraguan police officers have also demonstrated a propensity for 
holding peers accountable for police misconduct. Compared to Northern Triangle 
police forces, Nicaraguan police officers are more likely to respect the civil rights 
of juveniles and report abusive practices of their colleagues. Nicaraguan police 
officers are especially mindful to prevent extrajudicial punishments toward youth 
gang members.149 Various human rights organizations have lauded police efforts 
of advocating self-accountability to reduce incidents of abuse. Furthermore, they 
have observed that the Nicaraguan Police, unlike in other Central American 
countries, have not formed anti-gang death squads. In the instances where 
police officers were implicated in the illegal killing of a person, police officials 
were prompt to prosecute their offenses.150  
1. Strengthening the Juvenile Criminal Justice System 
To reinforce the community policing model, the Nicaraguan government 
also modernized its juvenile criminal justice system. The state has provided 
juveniles additional safeguards when facing criminal trials by introducing 
legislation, like the Code of Childhood and Adolescence (1998) and institutions 
like the Technical Office for Monitoring the Juvenile Criminal Justice System 
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(2001). Through these measures, the state has an obligation to provide juveniles 
between the ages of 13 and 18 years of age technical legal assistance to ensure 
they receive a fair and speedy trial. The Code of Childhood and Adolescence and 
the improved juvenile criminal justice system were influential in ensuring that 
judges impose rehabilitative sentences rather than condemn youths to long 
prison sentences. Within the last ten years, these measures have significantly 
reduced the incarceration rates of youth. Nicaraguan judges are now 85 percent 
more likely to sentence juveniles guilty of petty crimes to rehabilitative 
counseling, job training programs, and community service. By sending fewer 
juveniles to prison, the juvenile criminal system in Nicaragua permits youth to 
learn from their mistakes in an effort to reduce repeat offenders. More significant, 
the state is sending fewer teenagers to jails where they would stand a greater 
chance of being victimized by other criminals or further indoctrinated into the 
criminal lifestyle.151  
Nicaraguan prison guards also undergo extensive training to ensure the 
proper treatment of prisoners. Prison guards have to complete 344 hours of 
training to earn their certifications to work within the Nicaraguan Penitentiary 
System. As part of their training, prison guards become proficient in ethics, 
internal order, and the rehabilitation of criminals.152 The Nicaraguan 
government’s effort to develop and professionalize its prison guard force 
reinforces its intention to use prisons as institutions of rehabilitation, especially 
for juvenile inmates. 
2. Military Support of Internal Security 
Although permitted by the constitution, the national police have not 
included the support of the Nicaraguan Armed Forces to support its anti-gang 
efforts. Nevertheless, the armed forces do contribute to safeguarding the nation’s 
internal security. To prevent duplication of efforts, the armed forces are limited 
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principally to providing security in rural areas that lack police presence and to 
interdicting illicit transnational trafficking organizations. In particular, the 
Nicaraguan Army and Navy are extremely active in patrolling the overland and 
maritime transit routes to prevent the trafficking of drugs, persons, and other 
illegal products into the country. Besides these policing functions, the armed 
forces neither operate within the Nicaraguan urban centers nor support the 
national police in anti-gang operations. In instances where the military and police 
conduct joint law-enforcement operations, the National Police oversees and 
authorizes all efforts.153 
3. Strengthening Relations with Civil Society Organizations and 
NGOs  
Nicaragua has established various governmental institutions to reinforce 
the community policing model and partnerships with civil society and NGOs. The 
Ministry of Interior (MIGOB) is the most prominent organization, for it is the 
executive body for various public security and criminal justice directorates, to 
include the General Directorate of the National Police and the General 
Directorate of the National Penitentiary System.154 According to assessments 
from the Security and Defense Network of Latin America (RESDAL), MIGOB 
collaborates extensively with the National Council for Citizen Coexistence and 
Security and the Human Rights Ombudsman. In doing so, it ensures that the 
efforts of its subordinate directorates remain in harmony with civil society 
demands and in compliance with human rights protocols. By way of regionalized 
Social Crime Prevention Committees and security councils, Nicaraguan citizens 
can broadcast their security and institutional concerns to the MIGOB.155 
Consequently, MIGOB has been able to garner expansive public participation to 
develop optimal, less repressive crime prevention and anti-gang policies. 
Through this composition, MIGOB and the Nicaraguan civil society remain in 
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agreement and committed to the prevention approach over mano dura 
policies.156  
MIGOB has also incorporated the support of NGOs and church 
organization to reinforce its gang prevention and rehabilitation approach. 
According to José Luis Rocha, policing strategies that integrate support from 
NGOs are highly proactive in reducing gang violence. NGOs and church 
organizations have been able to reinforce police-sponsored community-building 
projects because they help establish job programs for unskilled youths and 
encourage civic participation. With their incorporation of these aid organizations, 
the state can ensure more Nicaraguan youths gain access to vital assistance 
programs. Moreover, these organizations have been influential in providing 
outreach programs to youth that live in extreme poverty and are at-risk of joining 
gangs. NGOs can also overcome the limitation of state funded projects because 
they can incorporate additional monetary resources with the support of 
international aid organization. Through their participation, they have been able to 
create job opportunities for former and current youth gang members. 
Consequently, NGOs and church organizations have contributed to the overall 
decline in gang memberships and youth violence.157 
D. PANDILLAS VERSUS NORTHERN TRIANGLE MARAS  
Although the Nicaraguan pandillas created a national public security crisis, 
government efforts have been effective in preventing them from becoming as 
violent as the criminal gangs operating within the Northern Triangle nations. 
Compared to the Central American maras, such as the highly violent MS-13 and 
Barrio 18, Nicaraguan youth gangs remain significantly smaller, highly 
fragmented, and less hostile toward local citizens and state actors. Unlike the 
maras that consist of thousands of members, pandillas now rarely exceed more 
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than 20.158 UNODC studies estimate that there are currently about 268 youth 
gangs in Nicaragua with close to 4,500 members in all (see Table 4).159  




 Honduras 36,000 
 Guatemala 14,000 
 El Salvador 10,500 
 Nicaragua 4,500 
 
Migration patterns also help explain why maras and the U.S. gang culture 
remain elusive in Nicaragua. Historically, Nicaraguan immigrants prefer to 
migrate to Costa Rica, with a smaller percentage choosing immigrant 
communities of South Florida. Nicaraguan immigrants have not adopted the 
violent behaviors synonymous with U.S. gangs and maras since gang presence 
in both these locations are minimal. Conversely, immigrants of Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala often settle in U.S. cities, such as Los Angeles, that 
are rife with gang violence and have high mara populations. Furthermore, 
Nicaraguan youth have not had to join gangs for survival and a sense of 
belonging since their families have better assimilated into their new communities. 
When Nicaraguans have had to return to their country, either by choice or 
through deportations, they have not imported gang customs.161 
However, Nicaraguan migration patterns and U.S. immigration policies 
alone do not justify why Nicaraguan pandillas did not become as prominent and 
as violent as the Northern Triangle maras. It is significant to note the prominent 
role the Nicaraguan public security institutions and civil society played to reduce 
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the homicide rates that surged soon after the Nicaraguan civil war ended in 1990. 
More importantly, it is necessary to recognize the actions the Nicaraguan 
government undertook to reduce the national homicide rates in half within a ten 
year period. By acknowledging the efforts the Nicaraguan government and civil 
society carried out to support disenfranchised youth, policymakers can gain 
greater insights into the development of effective anti-gang and youth enrichment 
programs.  
E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In comparison to the Northern Triangle countries of Central America, the 
Nicaraguan government has been extremely successful in addressing its youth 
gang crisis. By pursuing a community-oriented policing strategy, Nicaraguan 
officials have drastically reduced juvenile delinquency by promoting the 
reintegration of disenfranchised youth into society through gang prevention, 
rehabilitation, and community-building programs. Moreover, the Nicaraguan 
government has done a more effective job in incorporating the support of civil 
society organizations and NGOs to extend opportunities to at-risk youth. With the 
collaborative effort of the state and civil society, juveniles and young adults are 
gaining access to essential educational opportunities and jobs training. By 
gaining valuable skills, Nicaraguan youth are decreasing their necessity to join 
criminal gangs.162 Through the community policing strategy Plan de Acción y 
Exposición, the Nicaraguan government has managed to equally reduce its 
national homicide rates and extend a helping hand to its at-risk youth 
population.163  
The Nicaraguan government has also taken added measures to 
professionalize and develop its criminal justice institutions to reinforce the values 
of community policing.164 By advancing the professionalism of the Nicaraguan 
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National Police, police officers are learning to work closely with vulnerable 
communities and serve as mentors to misguided juveniles. As communities 
expand their relationships with police officers, communities are experiencing 
significant declines in youth incarceration rates and gang memberships.165 
Criminal court judges are also learning to impose more rehabilitative sentences, 
such as rehabilitative counseling, job training programs, and community service 
duties. Rather than condemning youths to long prison sentences, where they are 
likely to join gangs and adapt criminal behaviors, judges are issuing sentences 
that are permitting adolescents to learn from their mistakes. The judicial shift to 
deliver alternative sentencing has contributed to the overall decline of the youth 
incarceration rate and the prospect of juveniles becoming repeat offenders.166 
Nicaraguan prison guards also undergo extensive training to ensure the proper 
treatment and rehabilitation of imprisoned youth criminals. The government 
invests in the training and development of its prison staff to ensure that offenders 
can successfully reintegrate into society when they complete their sentences.167 
In keeping with the community policing model, the Nicaraguan criminal justice 
institutions have promoted the rehabilitation of at-risk youth, rather than policing 
through repression and mass incarcerations. 
In sum, Nicaraguan government institutions, civil society organizations, 
and NGOs have all contributed in reducing the national incidents of youth 
violence and expanding opportunities to disenfranchised youth. Dissimilar to the 
Central American youth that have been exposed to mano dura policing, 
Nicaraguan youth are responding positively to the community-oriented 
preventative polices of the Nicaraguan government. Nicaraguan youth are more 
likely to view their government institutions as legitimate actors and respectful of 
their constitutional rights. Furthermore, Nicaraguan youth have greater 
confidence that the state and its partners will be more sympathetic and mindful to 
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improve their deprived social conditions. As long as the state continues to 
promote the consolidation of its institutions and the expansion of youth social 
programs, Nicaragua will be able to maintain its levels of youth violence low.168 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Soaring youth gang violence has transformed Central America into one of 
the most dangerous regions in the world. Governments of the region continue to 
experiment with various social, political, and security strategies to help bring 
about positive change to the spiraling crises.169 Honduras, similar to El Salvador 
and Guatemala, has implemented robust anti-gang laws and an aggressive 
militarized-policing strategy to restore public order. Central to its public security 
strategy is the implementation of mass incarcerations of gang members.170 
Conversely, Nicaragua, resembling Panama and Costa Rica, has pursued a 
significantly less aggressive anti-gang strategy. Central to the Nicaraguan 
approach are its community-oriented programs that promote gang-prevention 
and the social reintegration of former gang members.171 After analyzing the case 
studies of Honduras and Nicaragua, this thesis sought to identify primary factors 
that can help improve security conditions within nations enduring high levels of 
youth violence. In sum, this thesis confirmed the hypothesis that building strong 
and accountable criminal justice institutions as well as addressing the 
socioeconomic challenges that confront youth populations are necessary 
preconditions for reducing youth violence.  
Although both countries share geographic proximity, prior exposure to 
authoritarian governments, and ongoing economic struggles, their strategies to 
address youth violence diverge significantly. After exploring the judicial systems, 
law enforcement structures, domestic security policies, and existing social 
programs that each nation possesses, it is evident that Nicaragua is better suited 
to confront its youth violence problems. By studying Nicaragua, Honduran 
policymakers can extract valuable lessons for improving its public security 
strategy. In order for Honduras to achieve meaningful progress in reducing youth 
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violence, it will need to replicate some of the institutional reforms and community-
based prevention programs that Nicaragua has undertaken.  
Nicaragua’s preventative, community-oriented approach has allowed 
citizens to reclaim a more stable and secure environment, following the surge of 
youth violence that transpired when the civil war ended. With its less repressive 
approach, the Nicaraguan government has been able to reduce its high homicide 
rates and better address its youth gang crisis. The major difference between 
these two countries is that Nicaragua has undertaken meaningful efforts to 
achieve institutional reforms and expand social and preventative programs to 
support its at-risk youth. Reforms of the Nicaraguan criminal justice system have 
enabled the government to build more professional police forces that are highly 
responsive to the needs and concerns of its population.172 Through increased 
professionalism and accountability, the Nicaraguan police forces have garnered 
support and legitimacy within their communities. Furthermore, Nicaraguan youth 
have favorable views toward police officers due to their increased exposure and 
interaction with community members. As a consequence, Nicaraguan youth and 
private citizens are more likely to cooperate with government entities and less 
likely to partake in gang activities.173 
In contrast, the Honduran methodology to reducing the incidence of youth 
violence has been less effective. Its mano dura, zero-tolerance approach against 
youth gangs has done little to reduce the escalating levels of violence or to 
restore peace and tranquility within its territorial borders.174 A major reason that 
its mano dura policies have not succeeded is that the Honduran government has 
neither made meaningful strides toward reforming its criminal justice institutions 
nor expanded its government support of prevention and reintegration programs 
for its youth gang population. By embracing mano dura polices without emplacing 
necessary reforms, Honduras will retain the regrettable distinction of possessing 
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the highest per capita homicide rate in the world.175 Moreover, disenfranchised 
youth will continue to seek the support of criminal gangs if the government does 
not make their social inclusion a national priority. The Honduran government can 
vastly decrease gang memberships by expanding educational, vocational, and 
economic opportunities. In order for the Honduran government to increase this 
capacity, it will also need to vastly improve its inclusion and interoperability with 
NGOs, religious organizations, and civil society.176 If Honduras does nothing to 
strengthen its weak and corrupt institutions, the state itself will persist as the 
biggest perpetrator of violence, irrespective of the brutal gang presence that 
exists.177 
Without strong criminal-justice institutions, states struggle to establish 
public security and order. Efforts to use heavy-handed policies while maintaining 
weak criminal justice institutions only propagate the levels of violence in already 
unstable nations.178 Criminal organizations, such as youth gangs, increase their 
hostility toward state authorities when they perceive that their governments seek 
to unjustly persecute them.179 Rather than declaring all-out wars against gangs, 
states contending with high levels of youth violence need to commit to socially 
reintegrating youth who lack basic education and job skills. Government and 
NGO-sponsored prevention and rehabilitation programs are critical toward 
ensuring that struggling youths learn the skills to become productive members of 
society, rather than lifelong criminals.180 For these reasons, the institutional 
strengthening criminal-justice systems and extending government commitments 
toward the socioeconomic development of their youth are essential components 
to reduce youth violence in Central America. 
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A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States needs to remain an active partner in helping resolve the 
security challenges of Central American nations in crisis. Uncontrolled violence 
and instability can significantly compromise American interests in the region and 
further expose our nation to external security threats. Of greatest concern are the 
three Northern Triangle nations of Central America, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras. All three nations continue to endure soaring homicide rates despite 
their aggressive efforts to restore security. In El Salvador, the recent surge in 
youth gang violence has surpassed the levels of violence that existed during its 
civil war period. August of 2015 registered as the bloodiest month in the nation’s 
history, with 907 homicides.181 Despite the relative peacefulness that exists 
within Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama, Central America continues to rank 
among the most violent regions of the world. To improve the security strategies 
of the region, U.S. policymakers need to continue promoting programs that help 
strengthen institutional capacities of criminal justice institutions and expand 
social programs that assist at-risk youth.  
In 2008, the U.S. Congress initiated a security assistance and 
development program to help improve the threatening conditions of the region. 
This program is known as the Central American Regional Security Initiative 
(CARSI). Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Panama all fall within the purview of CARSI. With the backing of numerous U.S. 
government agencies, to include USAID, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
Departments of State, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department 
of Defense, CARSI is able to employ a myriad of security and development 
programs.182 Over the last seven years, the U.S. Congress has appropriated 
over $1.2 billion to help promote CARSI’s goals.183 
                                            
181 Enrique Garcia, “Agosto Cierra con 907 Homicidios, 29 por Día,” El Mundo, September 2, 
2015, accessed September 4, 2015, http://elmundo.sv/agosto-cierra-con-907-homicidios-29-por-
dia/. 
182 Meyer and Seelke, Central America Regional Security Initiative, 21–22, 26. 
183 Government Accountability Office, Central America, 9. 
 71 
CARSI’s five stated goals are as follows: 
1. Create safe streets for the citizens of the region; 
2. Disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband to, within, and 
between the nations of Central America; 
3. Support the development of strong, capable, and accountable 
Central American governments; 
4. Re-establish effective state presence, services and security in 
communities at risk; and 
5. Foster enhanced levels of coordination and cooperation between 
the nations of the region, other international partners, and donors to 
combat regional security threats.184  
Although CARSI possesses vast potential to improve Central America’s 
regional security, U.S. policymakers need to do more to support the initiative. 
Since the establishment of CARSI, regional homicide rates and the incidence of 
youth violence continue to remain high, especially within the Northern Triangle. 
Regrettably, not all CARSI programs have led to positive outcomes. However, 
CARSI policymakers can help achieve greater results by advancing anti-gang 
programs that have demonstrated to be successful in Nicaragua. By redoubling 
efforts toward proven policies, CARSI initiatives can ensure that past failed 
policies are not replicated. Moreover, CARSI policies can assist Central 
American states expand their institutional capacities to respond to public security 
threats and alleviate some of the socioeconomic factors that are compelling 
youth to join gangs.  
To strengthen weak criminal-justice institutions within Central America, 
CARSI-supporting agencies need to promote public security reforms that ensure 
that citizen rights are protected. In order to safeguard citizen rights, CARSI needs 
to encourage states to advance the training and professionalism of their criminal 
justice, law enforcement, and penal sector institutions. Central American states 
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all need to drastically diminish the military’s role in performing policing functions. 
The potential for human rights violations tend to increase when states become 
reliant on their armed forces to carryout policing actions. Furthermore, the 
equipping and training of high-cost, elite police units should be reduced. Scarce 
fiscal resources should be prioritized toward expanding the equipping, training, 
intelligence processing, and investigating capabilities of traditional police units. 
Well-trained and professional traditional police units, as opposed to small and 
aggressive tactical units, are better suited to produce safer neighborhoods. 
CARSI programs need to pressure government and criminal-justice 
institutions to increase their level of accountability to their citizens. By insuring 
that criminal justice institutions remain accountable to civil society, government 
entities are more disposed to perform in the best interest of their citizens. To 
promote fairness and decrease corruption, states need to impose harsh anti-
corruption measures for criminal justice officials. Increased mechanisms of 
accountability make certain that governments do not exploit or mistreat 
marginalized citizens and youth during vulnerable circumstances such as in 
criminal trials. CARSI should also advocate against the overuse of harsh prison 
sentences for minimal offences. To decrease the number of youth confinements, 
governments need to expand and safeguard the legal rights of children and 
juveniles. 
CARSI should also help promote the expansion of development and social 
programs that assist at-risk communities. One opportunity for expansion would 
be to promote the employment of gang prevention programs within the most 
impoverished communities. NGOs and civil society organizations need to be 
incorporated within government initiatives to increase the effectiveness of youth 
programs. The integration of NGOs and religious organizations is important 
because these groups are accustomed to running programs that help rehabilitate 
and reintegrate former gang members.  
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B. IMPLICATIONS 
It is of significance to U.S. strategic interests that U.S. government 
agencies continue to aid nations undergoing high levels of criminal youth 
violence. If left unconstrained, the proliferation of Central American youth 
violence can have severe consequences on the region and our American 
interests. Unresolved violence can weaken already unstable state institutions and 
increase the levels of instability throughout the Western Hemisphere. It is of vital 
importance that regional governments remain strong and credible because 
transnational organized crime constantly seeks to exploit the vulnerabilities of 
weak states. If the Northern Triangle countries cross into the weak state 
category, greater quantities of illicit drugs will continue to flow past our borders 
and devastate our American communities.185  
Regional instability can give way to increased government corruption as 
well as significantly diminish the public’s support of democratically elected 
leaders.186 An unstable Central America can also lead to an increase in the 
already high number of illegal immigrants entering the United States. Since 2012, 
tens of thousands of children have entered the U.S. illegally in astonishing 
numbers, in hopes of escaping the Central American violence. This trend will 
only continue to intensify further if the regional security issues are not resolved 
soon.187 It would not be an exaggeration to say that the U.S. has much to lose if 
it does not help improve the security conditions in Central America.  
As military leaders, we have an obligation to assist our hemispheric 
partners in addressing their youth violence crisis and bringing peace to one of the 
most violent regions in the world. By using the existing CARSI structure and 
collaborating with other U.S. agencies, we can help distressed communities 
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escape their vicious cycles of violence and despair. If we succeed in supporting 
the governments of Central America implement constructive reforms, their youth 
will eventually gain the opportunity to lead respectable lives without having to 
depend on criminal gangs to survive. More significantly, Central American 
nations can gain the capacity to develop comprehensive strategies to provide 
their citizens the stability and support they deserve. By helping youth achieve 
their goals for a better future, we will help heal social wounds as well as restore 
the security and prosperity of Central American nations. 
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